Wednesday, January 13, 2010
International Transport Safety Research
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), periodically publishes the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, which serve as regulations for its own activities and as a model for regulations issued by international organizations and domestic regulatory bodies throughout the world. In order to support technical considerations for revisions to these Regulations, the IAEA may undertake “Coordinated Research Programs in which Member States and international organizations may offer to participate. Five such programs are currently active in the area of radioactive material transport safety, and the purpose and status of each of these is discussed in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) “Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material” form a consistent, technically robust basis for international and national regulations governing the packaging and transport of radioactive materials. Changes to the IAEA regulations occur periodically, and can be expected to be reflected in international modal requirements and national regulations. Thus, the IAEA’s Transport Regulations have direct impacts on shippers and carriers of these materials.
Since their inception in 1961, the IAEA Transport Regulations have been periodically revised to keep them technically up to date and consistent with modern transportation operations technologies. These revisions are typically based on proposals made by Member States and International Organizations. They may include changes which are based on research results. In cases where proposals for change require additional supportive information, the IAEA can undertake “Coordinated Research Programs” (CRPs) to address the relevant areas. A CRP typically involves 5-7 Member States contributing their research efforts on a defined topic and the preparation of a consolidated report of the results.
There are several CRPs which are either ongoing or have been completed but have not yet been finally published. These CRPs may result in new regulatory requirements being developed and may form the basis for proposals to change the regulations.
IMPROVING THE OPERABILITY OF REMOTELY OPERATED VEHICLES (ROV)
ABSTRACT
Underwater Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) have a significant support role to play in offshore petroleum production facilities. The extent to which ROVs can replace diver-based operations depends significantly on ROV capacity and the relative costs of mobilising and implementing the two modes of underwater operation. This paper presents work directed at two aspects of ROV operability: the quality of visual information presented to the ROV pilots and the degree of station keeping control exhibited by the vehicle.
Significant improvement in pilot performance of selected maintenance-type tasks has been achieved by the use of a purpose built underwater stereoscopic video camera and
associated ship-based stereoscopic display unit. Two generations of cameras have now been built and used on a Perry Triton vehicle in use at the North Rankin A platform on the North West Shelf.
In a related program, stereoscopic images of the platform structure are processed to determine the relative position of the ROV. Changes in position are used as inputs to thruster control algorithms, with a view to enabling the vehicle to hold position in fluctuating current fields. The position data from the processed 3D images are linked to output from an on-board inertial system to enable position to be maintained despite periodic loss of visual information.
First trials of the combined vision-inertial system indicated some success, notably using the vision system, but indicated difficulties with the inertial package and its integration into the control process. An extension of this project is now being supported by the Australian Maritime
Engineering Cooperative Research Centre (AME CRC).
Saturday, January 9, 2010
FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTAL OIL RELEASES FROM FPSO OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
The MMS is investigating the potential impact of the operation of Floating Production, Storage and Offloading installations (FPSOs) in the Gulf of Mexico. One of the concerns of the MMS is the potential negative effect on the environment from accidental oil releases, and in connection with this they have contracted Ecology and Environment to conduct an environmental impact study. Ecology and Environment will calculate the consequences of oil releases on the marine and coastal resources and combine these findings with estimated frequencies of accidental releases. The work to estimating the frequency of accidental oil releases from FPSO operations has been sub-contracted to DNV. This report presents DNV’s findings.
Scope of Work
DNV’s scope of work includes predicting the frequency of unique accidental releases from operation of a generic FPSO in the GoM. The specification for the FPSO is taken from the “Scenario Report, Environmental Impact Statement on Floating, Production, Storage, and Offloading Systems on the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf” which provides an outline description of the FPSO and its operation. Where insufficient details are provided in the Scenario Report DNV has used judgement and experience of earlier FPSO risk analyses to supplement the information given. Good practice has been generally assumed.
The scope of the study includes:
- All aspects of operation of the FPSO from the wellheads, through oil and gas production to export of the oil by shuttle tanker, and the gas by pipeline to shore.
- Shuttle tanker transit risks to a shore terminal.
- The various utilities provided by the FPSO required for operation and support of the people manning the installation.
- External and environmental risk factors are also assessed.
The study does not include construction, installation commissioning and decommissioning of the FPSO, nor does it include drilling or work over of the wells. These were specifically excluded from the scope of work by MMS.
In addition to the basecase, the Scenario Report identifies options for the FPSO and its operation that may affect the environmental risk presented. These options have been qualitatively assessed to consider what impact, if any, they have on the overall risk. Also, DNV has identified a number of mitigation measures to reduce the risk due to accidental oil releases.
Margins of safety in FPSO hull strength
The important factors that should be considered when carrying out ultimate strength analysis are identified and discussed. Specific simplified procedures for determining ultimate strength are reviewed and compared against finite element approaches and probabilistic methods.
Sources of reserve and residual strength in FPSOs are identified and compared to those in discrete structural systems (e.g. offshore jacket structures). Performance indicators that are used for measuring the reserve and residual strength of structures are discussed and appropriate measures are selected for use in this study.
The report then draws back together the results from published investigations. There appears to be a trend that the reliability (i.e. factor of safety) in sagging is lower than that for hogging.
However, there is considerable variability in this, and so each hull arrangement needs to be considered on it’s own merits. Differences in reliability for sagging and hogging should ideally be minimized at the design stage for new installations, although there may be operational measures that can be adopted for existing installations.
Results from published investigations are then reinterpreted using the newly developed performance measures. Using simplified procedures for determining ultimate strength, five FPSOs representative of the North Sea fleet are also analysed. It is shown that hull configurations and relative member properties are important influences. Differences in the definitions of strength measures are noted, underlining difficulties in drawing comparisons between various FPSOs. However, it is clear that the margin (usually referred to as reserve strength) between the load corresponding to first component failure and the load corresponding to ultimate strength can vary considerably. It is also noted that the margin (usually referred to as the residual strength) between the load corresponding to ultimate strength and the load corresponding to some pre-defined displacement beyond the ultimate strength can vary considerably. It is concluded that there is no measure that can be used on its own to describe the performance of FPSO structures under extreme loading.
THE UTILITY OF RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN MARITIME SECURITY ANALYSIS
Abstract
The international maritime community has embraced the need to introduce and adopt security measures to protect vital shipping, facility and port assets from terrorist attacks. This said, the maritime security environment is dynamic and changing, and the specific nature of the threat can vary across time, from country to country, and – within an individual country – from port to port. Threat and risk assessments, and training scenarios, need to become more dynamic, and tailored to specific needs of individual ports, facilities and even vessels. To this end, we introduce a simple set of tools that may allow port and facility managers, and vessel security officers to perform their own individualized risk assessments; specifically the use of risk matrices to help identify their most likely risks, and develop security and training plans accordingly. Very simply, a risk matrix allows the user to identify how serious a risk is, based on the expected destructiveness (cost) of an event, and the probability of that event occurring.
Keywords Maritime security; maritime terrorism; risk assessment; risk matrix; risk analysis
ANALYSING OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS BY APPROACHING METHOD FOR MINIMIZING HUMAN ERROR
Abstract
This study clarifies the current traffic situation in the Istanbul Strait, TURKEY based on statistical information; 928 data from across 75 years. The main objective is to investigate the risk profile of maritime accidents in the Istanbul Strait, and then to build up a methodology for minimizing human error. Maritime accidents have occurred in spite of existing safeguards. The main reason is that these safeguards do not concern enough the minimizing of human error. Evaluation methods of human behavior are restricted, and it is very difficult to model it among all parameters of the components in a safety system.
The geographical and physical specifications of the Istanbul Strait are investigated and the potential threats defined as the risk profile. Then, proper analysis will be implemented on the resulting statistical information and the factors discussed are called 4M (Man, Machine, Media and Management) both individually and from an aspect of their mutual related effects. The existing safeguards are so evaluated, and their effectiveness is judged through carrying out experimental studies. For this purpose, the Ship Handling Simulator and actual onboard experiences have been utilized. These studies can provide the necessary data for understanding the human factors involved during navigation.
Keywords Maritime Safety; Istanbul Strait; risk assessment; human error; 4M
Safety Assessment Using Fuzzy Theory
Abstract
Uncertain input parameters may result from “fuzziness”, “randomness” or “fuzzy randomness”. With the use of fuzzy set theory, uncertain input parameters may be described mathematically as fuzzy variables or fuzzy random variables and may be integrated into safety assessment analysis. With the aid of α-discretization involving the multiple solution of special optimization problems, fuzzy input parameters are mapped onto the uncertain result set. If the deterministic input data are characterized by “fuzziness”, the fuzzy results are uncertain outcomes of the structural analysis; safety assessment may then be carried out using possibility theory. If the input parameters exist in the form of fuzzy random variables, the computed fuzzy failure probabilities may be used for safety assessment. A fuzzy 1st-order reliability method (FFORM) is proposed, which is capable of handling fuzzy as well as fuzzy random variables.
Tuesday, January 5, 2010
Control System Design Risk Assessment Using Fuzzy Logic
This manual describes a technique that can be used to assess the impact of the flight control system on aircraft configuration geometry. The primary purpose is to perform trade-off studies between different aircraft configurations in the preliminary design phases of development. It can also be easily automated and adapted for use in aircraft configuration optimization problems.
The underlying approach is to determine the control system structure that is needed to correct deficiencies in the dynamics of the aircraft. The complexity of the control system is assumed to measure the amount of risk associated with that aircraft (if it were built). Configurations that require a very simple control system architecture would incur only a small risk. Configurations with a very complicated control system would be assigned a higher risk.
The required control system architecture is determined using a set of fuzzy logic rules. These rules are developed using experience and knowledge about how control systems are designed. Using this approach, a control system is not actually designed for a given configuration under study. Only the required control system structure is determined. The final design of the control system would come after the final configuration has been selected and detailed aerodynamic and structural models are developed.
This report describes a procedure and rule base to determine the flight control design risk for the longitudinal axis of aircraft motion. Only one specification regarding aircraft flying qualities is considered. However, the rules and methods described in this report could also be expanded to include other design requirements and specifications.
Fuzzy Inference As An Approach To Safety Management System (SMS) Analysis
Safety analysis is one of the major areas of Ship Management company activity that frequently comes face to face with a nontraditional problem of "measurements of safety". The question arises of how to estimate or measure the safety level? There is no doubt that, post accident,
a priori statistical analyses or Formal Safety Assessment are not effective instruments to apply in a real-time interval, especially in emergencies. The majority of problems are directly linked with the human factor, which is very difficult to formalize.
The safety analyses generally serve as decision aids. Wise decisions are essential in any safety
program. Human decisions depend on numerous factors that transcend requirements and physical response, and many of these can be captured mathematically using fuzzy logic.
Fuzzy logic is conceptually easy to understand in SMS applications. It is flexible. With any given SMS it's easy to massage or layer more functionality on top of it without starting again from scratch, for example: to incorporate ISPS Code procedures into the already working SMS. Fuzzy logic is tolerant of imprecise data and there is a lot of such data in shipping.
Fuzzy logic can model nonlinear functions of arbitrary complexity. Fuzzy logic can be built on top of the experience of maritime safety experts and it can be blended with conventional control techniques. The most impressive feature is that fuzzy logic is based on natural language.
The paper highlights some problems mentioned above and contains the research findings on evaluation of technical and human factor impact on safety at sea using fuzzy logic approach and applying such factors (linguistic variables) as safety, fatigue, OOW distractions, deficiencies, near misses, skill, level of education and training, technical failures, company policy/culture, etc.
Risk Assessment of Fishing Vessels
The work described in this paper is concerned with the systematic analysis of the hazards of fishing vessels. Statistical data is reviewed and analyzed and fault tree analysis is applied to find the relative importance of each component with respect to system reliability. In this analysis, the loss of vessel is chosen as the top event, then branching out to the basic events such as human error, structural failure, fish on deck etc. This method is considered an essential approach for providing a much better basis for safety decision making.
Finally, in order to reduce the accidents to vessels and crew, some suggestions are made to reduce the probability of human error to improve the stability and safety of vessels.
Key Words: Fishing Vessels, Risk Assessment, Fault Tree, Human Error
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Laporan KNKT Kecelakaan kapal MT Maulana
LAPORAN INVESTIGASI KECELAKAAN KAPAL LAUT MELEDAKNYA MT. MAULANA
TIKUNGAN TELEPUNG, SUNGAI SIAK, RIAU
25 APRIL 2007
INGIN BACA SELENGKAPNYA: FULL REPORT
Pada tangal 24 April 2007, pukul 09.45 WIB, MT. Maulana sandar kiri di Jetty No. 1Pertamina Pekanbaru, Riau. Kemudian pada pukul 10.36 MT. Maulana melakukan bongkar muatan yang berupa ADO/Solar sampai dengan pukul 19.06 WIB.
Pada tanggal 25 April 2007, pukul 08.00 WIB MT. Maulana mulai bertolak dari Jetty No.1 Pekanbaru menuju pelabuhan Dumai untuk memuat premium sebanyak 1600 Kl. kapal berlayar sambil melaksanakan pembebasan gas (gas freeing) secara alami dengan membuka semua bukaan tangki (ullage, vent, dll)
Pada pukul 10.58 WIB, salah seorang awak kapal (serang) melihat adanya asap keluar dari Terminal listrik yang berada di bawah manifold tengah, dan segera melaporkan kepada nakhoda di anjungan, usaha pemadaman dilakukan dengan menggunakan pemadam jinjing dilakukan oleh Masinis II, Juru Minyak, Serang dan Kadet (Taruna Praktek). Ketika mendekati terminal listrik yang berasap, terjadi ledakan tangki muat 3 kiri dan kanan. Ledakan terjadi pada pukul 11.00 WIB. Lokasi Kecelakaan di daerah tingkungan kiri Telepung (00o 44’ 50” LU – 101o 42’ 25” BT).
Setelah ledakan, Nakhoda segera mengambil tindakan untuk mengkandaskan kapal, dan memerintahkan awak kapal untuk menggunakan jaket pelampung dan kemudian meninggalkan kapal (abandonship). Pemadaman terus dilakukan dari sisi sungai dengan dibantu masyarakat sekitar, POLAIR dan TNI-AL pos Perawang.
Hingga pada pukul 13.30, nakhoda memerintahkan awak kapal kembali ke kapal untuk melakukan pendinginan geladak dan proses evakuasi korban.
Akibat dari meledaknya MT. Maulana ini, 4 Awak kapal meninggal dunia dan kerusakan berat pada geladak tangki muat 3 kiri dan kanan, serta sistem perpipaan yang ada di atasnya.
Segera dilakukan investigasi oleh KNKT, yang ditemukan dari hasil analisis penyebab meledaknya MT. Maulana disebabkan oleh adanya kebocoran pipa hawa yng berdekatan dengan terminal listrik yang terbakarnya isolasi kabel dan atau material pembungkus kabel.
Investigasi ini menghasilkan beberapa rekomendasi yang ditujukan kepada pemerintah selaku regulator, pemilik kapal selaku operator, juga kepada awak kapal.
Monday, December 28, 2009
Hazards Identification and Prioritization in Formal Safety Assessment Using Fuzzy Logic Theory
jika ingin mengetahui lebih klik link berikut: FULL JURNAL
Hazards Identification and Prioritization in Formal Safety Assessment Using Fuzzy Logic Theory
Author: G. N. Dourmas; N. V. Nikitakos; M. A. Lambrou
Formal safety assessment of ships has attracted great attention over the last few years. This paper, following a brief review of the current status of marine safety assessment is focused on the hazards identification (HAZID) and prioritization process, as the first step in the formal ship safety assessment. A multicriteria decision making framework which is based on experts’ estimation is then proposed for hazards evaluation. This paper proposes an innovative methodological approach to evaluate hazards by turning the qualitative judgments to quantitative, where sets of general and domain-specific criteria are used to judge the relative consequences of alternative hazards. The proposed methodology has the innovative feature of embodying techniques of fuzzy logic theory into the classical multicriteria decision analysis. The paper concludes by exploring the potentiality of the above methodology in providing a robust and flexible evaluation framework suitable to the characteristics of a hazard evaluation problem.
Effect of mooring system on moored ship motions and harbour tranquillity
Keywords: moored ship motions; harbour tranquillity; mooring system; fender; mooring line; subharmonic motions; numerical simulation; wave; wind.
jika ingin membaca seluruhnya silakan klik link berikut: FULL JURNAL
Audit And Inspection Of Ship Safety
This Guide recommends a preventative approach to public health protection. A preventative approach requires more than merely responding to outbreaks and occasionally testing endproduct materials. Proactive health protection needs to be promoted though rigorous inspection and audit of the preventative control measures to check that they adequate and that they are functioning as intended. This chapter describes activities that port health officers should consider auditing to promote preventative public health protection and to maintain adequate standards and reputation.
The ship’s master or their representative must ensure the identification of health risks and the control of these risks. The role of the port health officer is to audit the systems put in place by the ship’s master, to verify the practical implementation of these systems, and to provide advice and assistance in improving these systems.
An inspection provides a snapshot of the ship’s operations and of how systems are implemented and maintained. The officer should examine and verify a sample of the risk assessment, the control measures and any associated monitoring. Port health officers should seek to identify risks arising from the activities on ships and the effectiveness of the ship’s own assessment of risks and control. Both the quality of any plans and the extent of implementation need to be assessed.
Assessment of Ship Safety Controls in the Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef For the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority has commissioned this report from Det Norske Veritas (DNV). It forms part of the Review of Great Barrier Reef Ship Safety & Pollution Prevention Measures launched in November 2000 by the Commonwealth Minister for Transport and Regional Services. The terms of reference for the wider review address a specific range of issues involved in implementing initiatives in five key areas:
- Extending the compulsory pilotage area in the Reef taking into account the availability of skilled pilots and possible impacts on fatigue management;
- Advancing the introduction of technological developments to track and monitor shipping operations in the Reef;
- Enhancing existing ship routeing, traffic management and emergency response arrangements;
- Constraining certain types of ships from operating in the Reef or adjacent to it having regard to their condition, operational status and / or cargo;
- Improving legislative powers of intervention and enforcement, heightening the level of offences and penalties, and ordering restitution, to the maximum extent possible under international law.
This work evaluates the effects of a range of preventative and mitigative controls on the risks associated with shipping activity (Points 1 – 4 above). Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) has been employed in making these judgements.
The area under consideration covers the Torres Strait and the Inner and Outer Great Barrier Reef Shipping Routes. These are characterised in greater detail in Section 2.1.
Assessing Uncertainty in Simulation Based Maritime Risk Assessment
Keywords: Uncertainty Analysis, Bayesian Simulation, Maritime Risk Assessment.
Safety Assessment of FPSO Turret-Mooring System Using Approximate Reasoning and Evidential Reasoning
turret-mooring system used on FPSOs is described in this paper. A safety assessment method suggested using approximate reasoning and evidential reasoning approaches is proposed in this study. Subjective safety modelling at the bottom level in a hierarchical framework is carried out using an approximate reasoning approach. The evidential reasoning method is used to combine or aggregate safety estimates at lower levels to produce the safety estimate at the system level. The four main sub-systems (Turret (T), Fluid Transfer System (FTS), Turret Transfer System (TTS) and Interfacing System (IS)) are thoroughly examined in order to perform a subjective safety assessment of the turret-mooring system.